Work in Progress
Ideas I think about at work
Just States and Markets? with Hannah McHugh
This paper analyses three different understandings of the relationship between states and markets and the ways in which each of them distributes power in society. First, a ‘states vs market’ view highlights the fundamental incompatibility between the market and the state logic by pitting one form of social organisation against the other. While this account of the state-market nexus is shared by liberal theorists that argued for widely different ways of organising a just society, we show that these different views share a common understanding of freedom and of the role that hierarchical organisations play in instantiating this value. In contrast, and second, a ‘states and market’ view emphasises how markets are embedded in state institutions and ultimately depend on them for their survival. This account introduces more clearly the role of power relationships between market participants by highlighting the need to democratically control the regulatory framework in which market actors operate. We attribute this kind of analysis to the contemporary work of different neo-republican political theorists who operationalised their view of freedom as the lack of domination. Building on these two accounts the paper argues for a third view labelled ‘states, markets, stakeholders’ which aims at going one step further and not only question the institutions in which markets operate but also the practices and norms that allow market exchanges to function. This focus on market practices allows this third view of the state-market nexus to identify another form of power inequalities that goes beyond the ones identified by the previous two accounts. Indeed, we distinguish between direct and indirect market shaping practices to show how in contemporary market relations some agents are granted positions of power that go unchallenged. In particular, we show that corporate governance arrangements are a crucial site of reproduction of market practices that entrench problematic power asymmetries.
The Legitimacy Demand of Democratic Mutualisation. with Ben Swift
The European Central Bank’s activism on stabilising government debt markets through a new discretionary tool has redefined the ECB’s relationship to national fiscal authorities. As a product of Draghi’s famous ‘whatever it takes’ speech, this new instrument underscores how recent crises have blurred the boundaries between monetary and fiscal policy within the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), raising urgent questions about the distribution and legitimacy of economic authority in Europe. What is ultimately at stake is the macroeconomic sovereignty of member states—not simply their technical capacity to govern, but their democratic capacity to do so on behalf of their citizens. Against this backdrop, the paper addresses the deepening political tensions within EMU’s institutional architecture, arguing that the project of monetary and financial integration confronts a fundamental trilemma: a monetary union of heterogeneous democratic states cannot simultaneously uphold deep financial integration, preserve national fiscal sovereignty, and maintain meaningful popular control. In practice, EMU has managed this tension by sacrificing democratic responsiveness, particularly in times of crisis, when decision-making shifts to supranational institutions insulated from domestic accountability.
This institutional configuration fractures the traditional bond between sovereignty and representation, producing what we term the legitimacy demand of democratic mutualisation: as financial and monetary competences are pooled to preserve systemic stability, the political authority underpinning them must be normatively justified to those subject to its effects. Existing accounts—whether grounded in output legitimacy or intergovernmental delegation—are insufficient to capture the democratic significance of these structural transformations. In response, we propose a standard of substantive representation, according to which EMU institutions must be responsive to the dual status of citizens as members of self-governing national communities and as co-authors of collective European decisions.
Situated between theories of democratic intergovernmentalism and democratic supranationalism, this standard offers a normative framework for evaluating the legitimacy of economic governance in the euro area. It reframes EMU citizens not as split subjects of national and European authority, but as unified agents with dual interests—requiring democratic control over domestic fiscal prerogatives and meaningful participation in the shaping of supranational financial and regulatory powers. In advancing this argument, the paper contributes to broader debates in political theory about the conditions under which delegated authority across borders can remain democratically legitimate, and how the normative logic of sovereignty must evolve in complex, interdependent polities.
The Political Theory of Regulatory Capture
In liberal democracies, technocratic institutions—such as regulatory agencies, expert commissions, and independent oversight bodies—play a central role in shaping, implementing, and enforcing business regulation. While these bodies are often justified on the grounds of expertise and epistemic authority, they are also frequently criticised for being susceptible to regulatory capture: the undue influence of special interest groups on ostensibly impartial decision-making. This phenomenon not only undermines the integrity of regulation but also raises deep questions about the legitimacy of technocratic governance within democratic systems.
Surprisingly, despite widespread concern across the political spectrum—from public choice theorists to neo-Marxists—the concept of regulatory capture has received little attention from political theorists. This paper addresses that gap by offering a philosophical analysis of regulatory capture that treats it as a paradigmatic challenge at the intersection of technocracy and democracy. Drawing on the political science and economics literature, it first reconstructs the concept and highlights its reliance on contested notions of the public interest. The paper argues that existing interpretations fail to adequately confront what might be called the fact of expertise: the idea that modern governance inevitably depends on specialist knowledge and professional discretion.
In response, the paper develops a civic theory of regulatory capture that aims to reconcile the need for expert-led regulation with the democratic imperative of public accountability. Rather than appealing to an abstract or static conception of the public interest, the civic approach foregrounds the importance of institutional design in cultivating civic trust, preventing epistemic corruption, and maintaining the legitimacy of technocratic institutions. The paper concludes by exploring how this framework can inform democratic reforms—such as participatory oversight, transparency mechanisms, and deliberative forums—that preserve the benefits of expertise while mitigating the risks of capture.